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David Cooper, Inc. v. Contemporary Computer Sys., Inc., 846 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (full-text).
Factual Background Edit
Respondent buyer purchased accounting software for his supermarket from appellant seller, Contemporary Computer Systems, Inc. The software had not previously been used with the type of operating system that respondent had, other than in tests at appellant's office. However, appellant's agents assured respondent of the compatibility of the two systems. The contract for sale included a "Special Amendment" which read: "If within ninety days (90) of installation date, Contemporary Computer Systems, Inc.'s Systems are not functioning as represented, then buyer may return systems to Contemporary Computer Systems, Inc., at no expense."
After installation was complete in April 1, 1988, the president of respondent made several complaints to appellant regarding the system through June 1988. He was assured by appellant's president that all problems would be worked out and was asked to tender the amount due. Respondent paid appellant $10,338.36. However, appellant's president denied that any reports of problems with the system were made.
On July 20, 1988, respondent sent a letter to appellant stating that the system was not working as anticipated and requested a refund of the amount paid. Appellant refused to pay the money and respondent filed this suit.
Trial Court Proceedings Edit
Trial court found in favor of respondent and entered judgment against appellant for $10,338.36. The court found that respondent acted within a reasonable time to reject the system.
Court of Appeals Proceedings Edit
Appellant contended that the election to reject was invalid because it was not made within 90 days as set out in the special amendment. Respondent countered that the 90-day provision was not an exclusive remedy. It further argued that even if it was an exclusive remedy, the time was extended due to assurances made by appellant's president.
The court found that the 90-day provision was not an exclusive remedy and the respondent had a reasonable time to reject the system. The court noted that there was evidence of numerous complaints by the buyer and assurances by the seller's president. Appellant was unable to demonstrate that the trial court's determination was not supported by substantial evidence, was against the weight of the evidence or erroneously declared or applied the law. Therefore, the judgment in favor of respondent buyer was affirmed.