Despite the history of offensive cyber activity being much longer than is commonly thought, cyber defense is still considered a new discipline. It is only relatively recently that states have established formal structures to provide for cyber defense, and cyber security more broadly. In this context, each nation has developed its own mix of public, private, and military organizations active in the field. The relationships between these organizations are based on the nation's unique circumstances, determining the overall shape of relations between the state and business, the approach to e-government, civilian control of the military, threat perception, and much more.
The United States is no exception and has developed its own approach to organizing cyber defense based on factors specific to it. But the wide range of organizational approaches to reaching a "best fit" template for successful cyber defense raises the possibility that other nations may have developed approaches that could be usefully adopted in a U.S. context.
This Paper introduces four different foreign approaches to cyber defense, each very different from the U.S. model. In surveying the cyber defense organizations of Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Estonia, the Paper aims not only to provide baseline information on overseas structures and planning in order to facilitate U.S. cooperation with international partners, but also to provide policymakers with an overview of effective alternative approaches that may be applicable in a U.S. context.