In this pamphlet, the U.S. Army identified winning the information war was one of the five modernization objectives necessary to achieve land force dominance. The term information operations was described as an integrated approach to gaining and maintaining the information the warfighter required to fight and win, while denying the same to adversaries. TRADOC Pam 525-69 outlined IO as an enabling means to implement future Army operations and our warfighting doctrine. It went on to explain that in a force-projection Army, support for warfighting could be provided from as far back as CONUS.
This pamphlet clearly recognized that the information age paradigm would change army organizations, doctrine, processes and operations. Moreover, it would change the way wars are fought. Conceptually, this pamphlet identified information as an essential dynamic enabling dominant military power at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
This was the Army's first formal conceptualization of a new and emergent field and the Army's role in it. It was expected to inspire critical thinking and discussion on the topic, and was quite successful in that it led to formal doctrinal development. The final point to be made is that it is significant that the Army, utilizing DOD and Joint Staff definitions, potentially reduced confusion and increased mutual understanding of these emerging information operations concepts.